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This article examines Argentine regional trade policy behavior in 1999. It seeks to account for the 
decision to defect from regional commitments by establishing non-tariff barrier restrictions on 
footwear products from its main regional trade partner Brazil. These unilateral measures triggered one 
of the most serious bilateral disputes between the two countries in recent years. The article challenges 
conventional interpretations of the origins of the crisis. It argues that defection reflected a convergence 
of interests between the private sector, which feared the competitiveness effects of the Brazilian 
devaluation, and Argentine macroeconomic policy-makers. The tension between the latter, supporting 
the unilateral measures and the foreign policy elite, in turn, was crucial in shaping Argentina’s final 
position in the crisis. Argentina’s decision to press the private sector for the negotiation of a voluntary 
export agreement and to eventually withdraw the measures reflected a balance or compromised 
between the hardliners at the Ministry of Economy and the MERCOSUR-committed foreign policy 
makers and diplomats. 
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In 1991, Argentina and neighbors Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay committed themselves 
to regional trade liberalization by signing the Treaty of Asuncion, which gave birth to 
MERCOSUR (Southern Cone Common Market). Despite the regional agreement’s initial 
success, it was significantly unable to discipline partners and to effectively constrain the use 
of unilateral measures restricting trade flows within the region.
1
 The Argentine government’s 
decisions to impose a number of unilateral measures restricting imports from Brazil, 
following the devaluation of the Brazilian currency in January 1999 constitute perfect 
examples of such behavior. These unilateral measures triggered one of the most serious 
instances of diplomatic and commercial conflict in MERCOSUR since the bloc’s creation. 
They were met with a very emphatic Brazilian reaction which included threats of retaliation. 
Despite an inflexible initial stance, the Argentine government eventually moderated its 
position and began putting strong pressure on the private sector to reach an agreement with 
their Brazilian counterparts. Although Brazil refused to legally enforce the voluntary export 
restraint (VER) agreement reached among the two national Footwear Chambers, Argentina 
decided to withdraw the measures. 
This paper examines the process of regional trade policy-making within the Argentinian 
government in 1999. It seeks to shed light on the factors leading Buenos Aires, first, to defect 
from its regional commitments, and later to disengage itself from the conflict and to push for 
a private sector solution. A different combination of factors is emphasized in the explanation 
of each of these policy choices/outcomes. The explanation of the establishment of the 
footwear restrictions stresses the convergence of interests between business and state actors, 
                                                          
1 On the origins and initial success of MERCOSUR, see Manzetti (1994). 
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which challenges prevailing interpretations of Argentina’s unilateral behavior in 1999. Most 
analyses of the Argentine measures have implicitly or explicitly relied on a neoclassical 
political economy perspective, emphasizing private sector pressure and government officials’ 
electoral calculations. While this theoretical lens is useful for looking at the role of the 
private sector in proposing the measures, it fails to take into consideration the existence of a 
strong macroeconomic interest by the Argentine Ministry of Economy, in imposing the 
restrictions. The analysis here hence qualifies prevailing neoclassical explanations by 
emphasizing the need of incorporating insights from statist approaches.   
Instead, the explanation of the formation of the final negotiating position adopted by the 
Argentinean government in 1999 incorporates insights from the bureaucratic politics 
literature, relaxing the unitary executive assumption and recognizing the analytical validity 
of intra-state bargaining and compromising. The Argentine government’s decision to push 
the private sector to negotiate Voluntary Export Restraint (VER) agreement with their 
Brazilian counterparts, can be explained as a compromise between the two agencies sharing 
power over regional policy-making in 1999: the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. 
The article is structured as follows. Section 1 discusses the theoretical underpinnings of 
conventional interpretations of the Argentine government’s protectionist behavior in 1999, 
and discusses its main shortcomings. It briefly reviews the advantages of incorporating 
insights from statist theories of foreign economic policy-making. In addition, the main tenets 
of the bureaucratic politics approach are reviewed. The latter is usually applied to the study 
of security issues, or high politics, and is less frequently used to account for trade policy-
making. However, the approach provides a number of illuminating insights into the process 
of regional integration policy-making, which usually (or at least in the case of Argentina) 
involves a number of executive agencies sharing power over the one policy instrument. 
Section 3 analyses the decision-making process within the Argentine government. It focuses, 
first, on the stage of policy formulation, looking at the interplay between footwear producers 
and the two sets of actors within the government with which their interests converged: the 
Under-Secretariat of Trade and the Minister of Economy. The discussion then turns to the 
formation of the final negotiating position adopted in the crisis with Brazil: the decision to 
push for a private sector solution. The final section summarizes the main arguments made 
and discusses their theoretical implications.  
 
 
2. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Argentina’s defection from regional cooperation agreements in 1999 triggered one of the 
most serious diplomatic and commercial crises between the two countries since they initiated 
political and military rapprochement in the late 1970s.
2
 It led to the suspension of on-going 
MERCOSUR negotiations and brought the bloc to the brink of collapse when in September 
1999 Brazil announced it would retaliate by imposing restrictions on Argentine exports. 
Given their severity, thus, the protectionist measures taken by the Argentine government 
received significant scholarly and journalistic attention.  
The prevailing interpretation of Argentina’s decision to restrict imports from Brazil in 
1999 has emphasized the role of the domestic industrial lobby. The Argentine private sector 
                                                          
2 For a detailed account of the problems between the two countries until 1979, see Hurrell (1998).  




was directly harmed by the sharp and abrupt change in the value of the Brazilian currency 
and, not surprisingly, vigorously demanded a mechanism of “compensation” for the expected 
“avalanche” of Brazilian imports into the Argentine market. Moreover, the fact that 1999 
was a presidential election year in Argentina has been taken to indicate the government was 
more responsive to these pressures than it would have otherwise been the case. For example, 
according to IRELA, the October 1999 elections and the increasing likelihood that the 
opposition candidate (Alliance Party Fernando De la Rua) would win “… made it more 
difficult for the Menem administration to resist pressure from the industrial lobby, which has 
been the hardest hit by the recession” (IRELA 1999: 8). Carranza (2003: 82) also argues that 
in 1999, “domestic politics gained centre-stage” in Argentina. According to this scholar, the 
vulnerability of domestic industries to Brazilian competition led the industrial sectors more 
affected by the Brazilian crisis to organize a new productive group, which included the 
associations representing the small and medium-sized farmers and the national industry and 
which pressed strongly for a revision of Argentina’s position in MERCOSUR. From this 
perspective, because the political survival of the weakened Menem administration depended 
upon support from these domestic coalitions, it had little choice but to yield to their demands, 
even at the cost of breaking regional commitments. Thus, as The Economist (1999), would 
put it at the time: “Having allowed industrial lobbies to seize control of their trade agendas, 
MERCOSUR’s politicians risk seeing undone much of the progress they had made towards 
free trade within the group.”  
This explanation of the motivations for Argentina’s contravention of regional 
commitments is consistent with public choice or neoclassical political economy approaches 
to economic policy-making. Neoclassical political economy focuses on the distributional 
consequences of specific policies and on the power and interests of social groups. From this 
perspective, the maintenance of a liberal economic order constitutes a public good and is 
seriously constrained by collective action problems. The latter reflect the asymmetry 
between the dispersed gains and the concentrated losses of economic liberalization (Bates 
1992; Bates and Kruegger 1993; Rodrik 1994). Rent-seeking groups that enjoy specific 
protection and benefit from subsidies, tariffs and other regulations face strong incentives to 
organize and block reform efforts. Along these lines, the enactment and maintenance of 
market-oriented policies, such as trade liberalization, requires a strong state which is 
uncompromising with groups whose rents are eliminated by liberalization, a profound 
economic crisis changing the latter’s perceptions of the balance of benefits and costs of the 
new policies; or changes in structural conditions triggering a shift in the balance of power 
among domestic coalitions (Haggard and Webb 1993; Bates and Krueger 1993; Rodrik 1994; 
Silva 1993).  
This approach is in fact illuminating when trying to account for the establishment/ 
persistence of protectionist policies in developing countries, and particularly in Latin 
America, where special interests benefited from protection during the import-substitution 
industrialization period, and hence presented significant resistance to the shift to the market 
in the 1990s. This interest-based perspective has also dominated accounts of trade policy-
making in the United States (Lake 1991). Given the central role played by the Congress in 
the US trade policy-making process, and the relatively open political process, such a 
perspective has indeed had significant analytical purchase. Special interests tend to enjoy a 
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myriad of entry points into the policy-making process.
3
 But does this societal approach have 
equal analytical leverage when looking at Argentina? A closer look at the dynamics of 
economic decision-making in this country, in fact, indicates that instead state-centered 
approaches have higher explanatory power. As several scholars have documented, the 
Menem government in Argentina was significantly successful in isolating itself from societal 
pressure and implementing politically costly neoliberal reforms. It did so by manipulating 
institutions in a way such that the executive concentrated decision-making power and was 
insulated from political pressures and interferences (Blake 1998; Pastor and Wise 1999). The 
participation of the private sector in the design and implementation of economic policies has 
been significantly low and non-institutionalized. Instead, as this article documents, it has 
relied on informal connections with specific individuals within specialized agencies 
(Avogadro and Bouzas 2002; Jordana and Ramió 2002). 
Interest-based explanations also disregard the role of institutional factors, in particular, of 
the formal distribution of decision-making power among several governmental agencies as 
far as commercial policy is concerned. The shift to trade liberalization in the 1990s led to 
significant institutional reform in Argentina, aimed at adjusting pre-existing decision-making 
procedures and structures to the emerging complexities of a liberal environment. As a result 
of these institutional adjustments, two agencies came to be involved in trade policy-making: 
the Ministry of Economy (ME) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRECIC). In theory, 
the two agencies had separate and defined tasks and mandates; the ME was in charge of 
determining the strategic direction of commercial policy and designing and implementing 
specific measures, whereas the MRECIC was responsible for the design and implementation 
of the country’s broader strategy of international economic relations. In practice, as Jordana 
and Ramió (2002) point out, there was significant overlap, lack of much-needed coordination, 
and therefore frequent tension and conflict between the two agencies. Nevertheless, the ME 
had clearly a more central role in trade policy design and implementation. Its centrality was 
informally accentuated by the disproportionate weight assigned to macroeconomic and 
external credibility by Argentina during this period.  
The recognition of the existence of a concentration of power over decision-making in the 
ME brings into question the validity of societal interpretations of Argentine trade policy 
behavior in 1999. But as the analysis below will stress, close attention to empirical evidence 
underlines an even more serious shortcoming of these explanations. The empirical analysis in 
fact shows that in 1999, the ME had clear and independent macroeconomic motivations to 
defect from regional commitments. This suggests that, even in the absence of strong sectorial 
pressure, the measures could have been taken. Put differently, the observation of the 
independent motivations for protectionist behavior by those state actors concentrating 
decision-making power at least rule out the possibility that the measures would have been 
established as a sort of electorally-motivated response to intensifying business lobbying. It 
sheds light on the existence of a convergence of interests between the state and the footwear 
sector in the establishment of the protectionist measures, thus underlining the need for a 
theoretical approach recognizing the strategic interaction between state and society in 
shaping policy outcomes.  
A focus on state-society relations can help account for the establishment of the footwear 
restrictions. However, it is not as useful for explaining the subsequent decision by the 
                                                          
3 A seminal study in US commercial policy putting forward this societal explanation is Schattschneider 
(1935). See also, Taussig (1931). 




Argentine government to push the private sector to negotiate an agreement on quantities with 
the Brazilian Footwear Chamber. How can this seemingly inconsistent decision be 
explained? As the analysis in Section 2 will document, this policy outcome must be 
understood in reference to the greater role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRECIC) in 
issues related to regional integration. Because the measures introduced by the ME triggered a 
diplomatic crisis with Argentina’s main regional trade partner, Brazil, the MRECIC came to 
occupy a central role in the decision-making process. These foreign policy makers had 
opposed the measures introduced unilaterally by the ME but had been institutionally unable 
to block them. However, the MRECIC was able to crucially influence the formation of 
Argentina’s negotiating position during the crisis these measures triggered within 
MERCOSUR. The VER hence emerged as a compromise between the two agencies, which 
now shared power over the definition of Argentina’s negotiating position.  
Through which theoretical lens can this second policy-making process be explained? The 
analysis above suggests the assumption that the Argentine state behaved like a unitary entity 
with homogeneous preferences and motivations, implicit in both neoclassical and statist 
perspectives, is inadequate when looking at the formation of Argentine negotiating position 
in 1999. A better understanding of this second policy outcome can therefore be achieved by 
incorporating insights from a third theoretical explanation of foreign policy: the bureaucratic 
politics approach. This permits relaxing the unitary executive assumption and examining the 
cleavages among different ministries and agencies involved in the formation and 
implementation of regional co-operation policy in Argentina.  
Graham Allison’s model of bureaucratic politics, in fact, represented an attempt to deal 
with the fact that the simplistic unitary actor assumptions made realist theories unable to 
account for frequently inconsistent or self-defeating state behavior. According to him, 
rational actor models treating the state as a monolith had to be balanced by the recognition 
that policy choices “... are the consequences of innumerable and often conflicting smaller 
actions by individuals at various levels of bureaucratic organizations in the service of a 
variety of only partially compatible conceptions of national goals, organizational goals, and 
political objectives” (Allison 1969). According to Allison, foreign policy decisions could not 
be understood as rational choices, as Realists claimed. Rather, it was the outcome of “various 
overlapping bargaining games among players arranged hierarchically in the national 
government” (Allison 1969; 1971). Allison recognized that the nature of foreign policy 
issues was conducive to disagreements among different governmental actors regarding what 
ought to be done. Different institutional positions resulted in divergent responsibilities or 
“missions” and hence encouraged differences in perceptions and priorities. Positions ― 
“where you sit” ― does not only determine “where you stand” but also affects players’ 
relative power. Because these individuals with divergent preferences shared power, foreign 
policy was usually the result of a bargaining game between them. These games were 
structured by “action-channels”, which determined their points of entry into the game and 
their relative position. Sometimes policy decisions reflect the triumph of one group over 
others. More often, however, as a result of different groups pulling in different directions, 
policy outcomes are different from what any of these groups would have intended (Allison 
1969; 1971). Put differently, although individual players were assumed to behave in a 
“rational” way, the “pulling and hauling” of politics could deviate state behavior from the 
course of what would have been chosen by a unitary rational actor.  
A central proposition in this model is that the preferences and perceptions of individual 
players stem from their particular bureaucratic position, summarized in the widely quoted 
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“where you stand depends on where you sit” statement. While asserting that propensities and 
priorities stemming from bureaucratic position are strong enough to allow analysts to make 
reliable predictions, Allison recognized that personality also plays a role in the determination 
of a player’s stance on many issues. According to him, officials come to their positions “with 
baggage in tow.” In response to extensive criticism about the lack of clarity in the 
specification of the sources of preferences, and in particular, about the relative weight of 
bureaucratic position and personality,
4
 the second edition of Essence of Decision cautioned 
that “depends on” should not be taken to mean “is determined by.” According to Allison and 
Zelikow (1999), therefore, the central thesis of the bureaucratic politics model should read 
“where you stand is substantially affected by where you sit” (Allison and Zelikow 1999: 307; 
Bernstein 2000).  
Despite the extensive criticism received by Allison’s bureaucratic politics approach, it 
provides a number of valuable analytical insights for looking at regional trade policy-making 
in Argentina. The model’s most valuable contribution is its relaxation of the unitary state 
assumption. At the same time, the proposition that players’ goals and policy stances are 
significantly determined by their institutional missions and bureaucratic positions is useful 
for understanding the divergences among different executive actors regarding MERCOSUR 
policy. The bureaucratic politics model thus permits accounting for the fact that divergences 




3. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FOOTWEAR RESTRICTIONS 
 
The Argentine decision to establish restrictions on Brazilian footwear imports in 1999 
must be understood within the context of the accumulation of unresolved issues between the 
two countries during the six months following the devaluation of the Brazilian currency in 
January. The actual economic impact of Brazilian devaluation on the Argentine economy 
was not felt until the second trimester of the year. However, the devaluation had an 
immediate impact on perceptions and confidence of the main economic actors in Argentina, 
particularly the industrial sector. Fears of an “avalanche” of Brazilian exports “flooding” the 
Argentine market became the main excuse for the renewal of pressure campaigns by lobbies 
from across the industrial spectrum. The overall perception was that the devaluation had 
given Brazilian exporters a large advantage over their regional competitors. The evident 
deterioration of fiscal, employment and social indicators resulting from the recession 
affecting Argentina since 1998 contributed to the exacerbation of political unrest of many 
sectors. 
The Argentine government initially attempted to downplay and contain the private sector 
harsh reaction. However, by April 1999, the Argentine Ministry of Economy (ME) began 
demanding more emphatically some mechanism of compensation for the local affected 
sectors. In Brazil these demands were met with widespread opposition, and particular 
irritation from business sectors and some governmental officials. Menem’s calls for 
dollarisation in the region further added to Brazil’s hostility. Tension rose further when 
Buenos Aires announced the establishment of two measures of very dubious compatibility 
with MERCOSUR commitments: anti-dumping duties on Brazilian steel imports and quotas 
                                                          
4 See for example, Welch (1992); Krasner (1972); Bendor and Hammond (1992); etc.  




in the textile sector (IDB 2000). Brazil rejected both measures emphatically and threatened 
to take Argentina to the World Trade Organization (WTO). The bilateral conflict continued 
to escalate in July when the Argentine ME passed a resolution regulating the use of the Latin 
American Integration Agreement (LAIA) safeguard measure system within MERCOSUR.
 5
 
Although the measure did not have any effective consequences at the time it was adopted, it 
set the stage for the future implementation of safeguards on intra-regional imports. In 
response, the Brazilian Foreign Ministry (Itamaraty) suspended its participation in all 
MERCOSUR negotiations and postponed a scheduled official visit by Argentine President 
Menem to Brasilia, “until a more conducive climate” was created (Clarín 7/29/1999). This 
serious crisis was however resolved promptly after Menem traveled unexpectedly to meet his 
Brazilian counterpart and agreed to withdraw the measure.  
However, only a few weeks later Argentina resorted once again to the unilateral way. On 
August 9, the ME issued a new technical rule (Resolution 508/99) establishing that all 
footwear products commercialized in the country should include a label with information 
about the inputs utilized in its production, as well as particulars of the producer or importer. 
Three days later, Resolution 977/99 introduced a system of non-automatic import licenses 
with the aim of certifying the observation of these labeling requirements. These measures 
were specifically targeted attempts to restrict imports in one of the sectors which had 
protested most vigorously about the effects of the Brazilian devaluation, the footwear 
industry. They triggered the most serious incident in MERCOSUR during 1999.
6
  
The rest of this section will examine the decision-making process leading the Argentine 
government to take these controversial measures. The analysis seeks to explain not only why 
Buenos Aires chose to defect from its regional agreements with Brazil, but also, and 
crucially, why it ultimately decided not to sustain its initially inflexible position and to 
instead leave the resolution of the conflict in the hands of the private sector. In this sense, 
two policy choices are analyzed. First, the decision to establish the unilateral restrictions and 
defect from regional commitments, which requires looking at the interaction between the 
private sector, and two government bodies, the Under-Secretariat of Foreign Trade (SCE) 
and the Ministry of Economy (ME). Second, we need to explain the final negotiating 
position adopted by the Argentine government: the willingness to disengage from the 
conflict, to promote and support a private sector agreement, and to withdraw the restrictions 
once this was reached, despite the fact that Brazil refused to formally enforce it. To account 
for this final stance it is necessary to acknowledge the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 




                                                          
5 LAIA Resolution 70/87. The Latin American Integration Agreement (ALADI in Spanish) was created 
by the Treaty of Montevideo, signed in 1980 by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, 
Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Perú, Uruguay and Venezuela. LAIA’s main goals were to increase 
bilateral trade among member countries and between members and third countries through bilateral 
and multilateral agreements. A total of 40 partial scope agreements involving two or more countries 
were signed in the 1990s within the framework of LAIA.  
6  For example, Brazilian Foreign Minister Luiz Felipe Lampreia stated in September that “… 
MERCOSUR’s current crisis is the most serious since the agreement was established in 1991”, quoted 
in La Nación (7 Sept. 2002).  
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3.1. Establishment of Footwear Restrictions: A Convergence of Industrial Interests  
and Macroeconomic Considerations  
 
The establishment of the unilateral measures is best understood by examining the process 
of interaction between two agencies: the SCE, which channeled private sector pressure and 
designed the measure, and the ME, which endorsed it due to its own independent 
macroeconomic concerns. Neoclassical political economy interpretations are accurate in 
highlighting the strong pressure by the footwear sector in 1999. This was in fact a crucial 
factor in the establishment of the measures. However, these lobbying cannot by itself be seen 
as the determining factor. First, the private sector input was converted into a specific policy 
proposal by the SCE, the main body in charge of designing trade policy measures according 
to the Argentine institutional structure. Second, the establishment of the measures depended 
on the endorsement by the Ministry of Economy. In 1999, the latter agreed to pass the 
measures because he saw them as contributing to his broader macroeconomic priorities.  
The local footwear producers were in fact one of the most vocal in their complaints and 
demands for a compensation mechanism allowing them to contain the avalanche of Brazilian 
shoes in the Argentine market. In rejection of the Argentine President’s decision to yield to 
Brazil’s position on the safeguards measure, in late July 1999 the footwear and leather 
sectors organized a massive demonstration (attended by 10,000 people) outside the Ministry 
of Foreign Relations. Both business and labor representatives complained and demanded 
urgent measures of relief, given “the massive imports of shoes from Brazil .…” (La Nacion 
7/30/1999). Their intense lobbying campaign included not only direct pressure on individual 
officials in the executive but also on representatives in Congress, particularly those 
campaigning for the elections in October 1999. The sector also made heavy use of the media 
in their attempt to complain and impact public opinion: “This situation, if persisting, 
threatens to cause the destruction of the footwear industry … I still refuse to sign the death 
certificate of the footwear industry ….”; “… If measures are not taken, 50% of the industry 
will soon disappear …” (Bueno 1999).
7
 This apocalyptic rhetoric, placing emphasis on the 
imminent demise of a traditional Argentine industry — at the hands of “unfair”, illegal”, and 
“predatory” Brazilian imports “invading” the Argentine market — found an unconstrained 
outlet in the local press.
8
 
This intense lobbying during the first half of 1999 did not, however, reflect the actual 
economic impact of the Brazilian devaluation on the footwear sector. The much-feared 
avalanche had not, at this point, yet materialized. It could be well argued that the sector’s 
lobbying reflected its concerns with the expected effects of the Brazilian devaluation. To 
understand why this group was so vocal and so keen on obtaining protection, however, it is 
useful to consider the effect of two political economy factors also shaping its position: the 
end of the previous regime of concessions which had protected the sector until December 
1998; and the internal fragmentation of interests characterizing the sector. The Brazilian 
devaluation thus built on pre-existing economic and political dynamics to create great 
incentives for the footwear sector to oppose co-operation within MERCOSUR.  
                                                          
7 Carlos Bueno, Head of CIC, quoted in Argentine news reports.  
8  An anonymous interviewed government official stated a common practice among the industrial 
sectors was to “buy” the press as an attempt to indirectly influence government decisions. 




First of all, in 1999 the Brazilian devaluation was expected to exacerbate the negative 
effects of the much-feared end of the transition period stipulated by MERCOSUR treaties, so 
as to give the industry time to restructure and improve its productivity levels. After decades 
of protection, the Argentine footwear sector had been severely affected by the process of 
trade liberalization launched by the government in the early 1990s. Absence of economies of 
scale, poor access to financing facilities, and an overall limited investment in technology, left 
Argentina’s shoes at a serious competitiveness disadvantage vis-à-vis shoes from Brazil, 
South East Asia, and China. In light of this, when signing MERCOSUR agreements in 1991, 
the government decided to provide the footwear sector temporary exemption from the 
process of intra-regional liberalization. In 1995, the sector was placed in the so-called 
Transition Regime, according to which intra-bloc tariffs would be gradually phased out, 
reaching 0% in 1999. As tariffs were progressively eroded, the competitive pressure exerted 
by Brazilian imports began to be felt. The sector thus feared that the devaluation of the 
Brazilian currency, by accentuating the competitive asymmetry between the two sectors, 
would exacerbate the already significant Brazilian penetration of the Argentine market 
(Zappia 2002). 
The aggressive campaign of Argentine footwear producers was also at least in part a 
consequence of the conflictive dynamics and high degree of polarization characterizing the 
sector. A central cleavage in the industry pitted local producers, represented by the Footwear 
Industry Chamber (CIC) against a smaller group of importers and other national 
manufacturers at least partially engaged in international trade, and represented by the 
Chamber for the Foreign Trade of Footwear (CAPCICA). Most CAPCICA members were 
local manufacturers which in the early 1990s had shifted to the importation of shoes as a 
response to their inability to face the competitive pressures brought about by the opening of 
the market. They had constituted themselves in a vocal organization in 1993, with the 
objective of counterweighing the intense lobbying campaign which local producers had 
launched in 1993 in their attempt to obtain protection from growing Asian imports (Melhem 
2002). The temporary quotas on Asian shoes established in 1997 in response to CIC’s 
pressure had severely harmed CAPCICA members’ interests.
9
 The devaluation of the 
Brazilian currency also had differential impacts on members of CIC and CAPCICA. To the 
extent that the latter had business interests in Brazil, the devaluation in fact benefited them. 
The restrictions and compensation mechanisms demanded by CIC was instead against their 
interests, and they were thus strongly opposed by CAPCICA. The group also opposed the 
private sector agreement which CIC had begun negotiating with the Brazilian Footwear 
Chamber, Abicalçados. CAPCICA’s attempts to block CIC’s lobbying for compensatory 
measures in 1999 meant the local producers were forced to press harder themselves if they 
were to influence the government’s choices.  
Because of the lack of institutionalized channels of participation of the private sector in 
the trade policy-making process, local producers targeted specific government officials and 
agencies in their lobbying efforts. The Under-Secretary of Foreign Trade, in charge of 
                                                          
9 For example, according to Alberto Grimoldi, one of the largest and oldest domestic producers which 
had adopted a complementary foreign trade strategy in the 90s: “… We had (…) a business plan that 
was compatible with what Argentina had declared would be its commercial policy in the early 90s. 
And from one day to the other, Argentina altered the rules in a violent and illegitimate way, to the 
point that it has been recently condemned by the WTO ….” Alberto Grimoldi, President of Gimoldi 
SA, Interview, published in La Nación (9 Jan. 2000).  
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designing and implementing trade policy regulations, became the natural target of the 
footwear makers’ campaign. The footwear restrictions were in fact designed and put forward 
by the Under-Secretary of Foreign Trade, Felix Peña and his team at the SCE. According to 
the Under-Secretary of Foreign Trade, Felix Peña, the proposals and input provided by the 
private sector were central in the formulation of the restrictions. Like the footwear industry, 
however, Peña believed the NTBs were necessary to curb the great increase in shoes from 
Brazil that was expected that year. With them, the SCE had tried to “… mirror what they had 
done to us during 1998, always within the rules of the game” (Peña 2002). The measures had 
been carefully designed ― they imposed a labeling restriction and made the granting of (non-
automatic) import licenses contingent upon the certification that those labeling requirements 
were complied with. They were furthermore planned to at least halt shoe imports until the 
end of the year, when the seasonal change would make them irrelevant. 
However, due to its institutional subordination to the Secretariat of Industry, and to the 
Minister of Finance, the SCE by itself lacked decision-making authority. In order for the 
proposal to become an effective policy measure it needed the endorsement of the Minister of 
Finance. To many, this seemed unlikely, given Minister Fernandez’s strong neoliberal and 
free trade ideological orientation. But the Argentine Finance Minister had a more substantive 
and independent macroeconomic interest in the measures. Given his underlying concern with 
macroeconomic performance, and critically, given a number of coinciding external pressures, 
Fernandez saw the measures as instrumental in two interrelated ways. First, he shared with 
the private sector an interest in containing the feared “avalanche” of Brazilian imports and 
avoiding a further deterioration of Argentina’s balance of trade and payments deficit. This 
was seen as further complicating the internal and external situation faced by Argentina in the 
second half of 1999: the worst recession in a decade, rising unemployment and deepening 
trade and payments deficit. At the same time, by September, it had become evident that the 
footwear sector was in fact one of the most affected by the inflow of Brazilian imports 
(which had grown 60% during the first 6 months of the year, compared to the same period in 
1998). Even more so, the sector was important on account of its crisis and its unemployment 
ramifications, as well as the financial weakness of the two main companies.  Alpargatas and 
Gatic not only had together caused the loss of more than 9,000 jobs since the early 1990s, but 
were in 1999 close to default.  
Secondly, Fernandez was concerned with the financial and credibility effects of the 
Brazilian devaluation on the Argentine economy, and specifically, with the internal and 
external legitimacy of Argentina’s stabilization program. On the one hand, the ME was 
worried about the contagion effects of the Brazilian devaluation, which had led to a marked 
increase in Argentina’s country risk, and hence in interest payments on its foreign debt. His 
concerns were not only that the so-called caipirinha effect could trigger a currency crisis in 
Argentina, but also that investors’ fears that this could actually happen could lead to a further 
outflow of foreign capital. External capital was crucial for the sustainability of the 
convertibility program. In 1999 it was even more critical for pulling Argentina out of its 
recession and for financing its BOP deficits. According to Fernandez, the Brazilian 
government’s reluctance to come to a joint solution for neutralizing the contagion effects of 
the devaluation had led him to take the measures: 
 
We had several meetings [...] to explore how we could prevent the volatility of the real 
exchange rate (generated by the Brazilian devaluation) from having an impact on the other 
countries in the bloc. Those were the elements on which I placed strong emphasis and which I 




defended the most. Unfortunately, Brazil had a totally negative position regarding the need to 
co-ordinate macroeconomic policies …. (Fernandez 2000). 
 
According to Rodriguez, that had motivated him to impose restrictive measures, first 
accepting to pass the resolution regarding the LAIA safeguards (also proposed by the SCE) 
and eventually endorsing the footwear restrictions. In this sense, Argentina’s unilateral 
measures in 1999 should be seen as at least partly a consequence of the subordination of 
regional trade commitments to the broader concerns of macroeconomic and exchange rate 
stabilization. They reflected the constraints, which the fixed exchange rate regime (the 
convertibility program) implemented in Argentina between 1991 and 2001 imposed on the 
government’s ability to deal with negative external shocks.
10
 In 1999, the Argentine 
economy was forced to confront several converging external pressures ― declining 
commodity prices, reversal of foreign capital flows after the South East Asian, Russian and 
Brazilian devaluations, and the competitiveness shock brought about by the Brazilian 
currency crisis. The effect of these, in turn, was compounded by the critical and aggravating 
domestic situation. In this context, and with a currency regime preventing the use of the 
exchange rate to adjust to the effect of these shocks, the cost of giving up trade policy 
autonomy at the regional level grew tremendously.  
Argentina’s protectionist measures in 1999 also constituted attempts to neutralize 
emerging discontent with exchange rate management and ensure the political sustainability 
of the fixed exchange rate regime.
11
 The ME, aware that the credibility of the Argentine 
economy and the legitimacy of the convertibility plan depended on its internal support, also 
saw the measures as political concessions to the domestic private sector. Although for most 
of the 90s the convertibility framework had been broadly supported by the private and public 
sectors, as the economy sank more and more into recession it had come under increasing 
criticism from various groups in the economy which stood to lose from the overvaluation of 
the peso. The Brazilian devaluation had further accentuated the uneasiness of the private 
sector, particularly of the “hard-liners” at the Argentine Industrial Union, with the rigidity 
the currency board imposed on the government.
12
 Thus, as economic groups began to feel 
threatened by the overvaluation of the currency, and by the government’s inability to use the 
exchange rate to adjust for macroeconomic shocks, from the ME’s perspective it was less 








                                                          
10 On the convertibility program, see Starr (1997). 
11 According to Campbell (Interview 2002) “… in 1999, many sectors criticised MERCOSUR when it 
was really an indirect way of criticising the convertibility regime …” 
12 For example, a leading Argentine industrialist, Roberto Rocca of Techint called for “a more flexible 
exchange rate system” abandoning the fixed parity with the dollar. Quoted in Carranza (2003: 82).  
13 Thus, according to Peña (Interview, 2002), “we gained time with the discovery of Res. 70 ― we used 
to tell people (industrial sectors) we did have something with which to negotiate with Brazil, even 
before we made the move …. Finally in July when we could not handle the pressure of sectorial 
groups any longer, we decided to go one step further.”  
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3.2. Negotiation of a VER: MRECIC’s Strategic Interests vs. ME’s Macroeconomic  
Concerns  
 
Given this strong macroeconomic and political economy rationale for the measures, why 
did the Argentine government eventually decide to disengage itself from the conflict? In fact, 
after a few weeks of diplomatic and commercial turmoil, Buenos Aires and Brasilia began to 
press the private sector for the negotiation of a temporary agreement on quantities. The 
Argentine government eventually agreed to withdraw the restrictions. To understand this 
seemingly puzzling shift in the Argentine position, it is important to look at how two central 
executive agencies, the ME and the MRECIC shared power over international economic 
negotiations in general, and MERCOSUR issues in particular. Moreover, the unilateral 
measures taken by Argentina in 1999 were not derived from an overall consensus within 
government. Instead, they gave way to intense intra-bureaucratic wrangling among the ME 
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRECIC). The ME’s willingness to disrupt diplomatic 
relations with Brazil were balanced by the more stable, strategic commitment of the 
MRECIC towards MERCOSUR.
14
 Ultimately, Argentina’s eventual support for a negotiated 
voluntary export restraint (VER) agreement ― reflected not only the process of state-society 
bargaining described above, but also the balance between these divergent intra-bureaucratic 
stances. 
While the ME’s position reflected a convergence of its independent macroeconomic 
interests and those of the private sector (channeled through the SCE), the MRECIC opposed 
any moves contravening MERCOSUR agreements. One factor explaining the MRECIC’s 
opposition to the measures proposed by the MRECIC was the differential degree of 
                                                          
14 According to La Nación (13 May 1999), the footwear sector’s demands for safeguards had “divided 
the group of most senior Argentine negotiators in MERCOSUR.” INTAL also states that it was the 
Argentine ME that, at the end of July 1999, had decided to apply LAIA Resolution N. 70, even if the 
Foreign Ministry “publicly opposed the LAIA strategy …” See IDB (2000: 26). 




penetration of this agency by protectionist interest groups. Partly because this Ministry was 
not directly responsible for the formulation and implementation of trade policy, it was not a 
target of private sector pressure. In fact, and particularly during the 1999 crisis, relations 
between this body and local industrial groups were significantly strained. The diplomats, and 
particularly the Secretariat of International Economic Relations, were strongly criticized by 
the private sector for their inability to stand up to Brazil (Clarín 7/31/1999). In the words of 
CIC’s Executive Director, Carlos Litzman (2002), “Campbell seemed to be working for the 
Brazilians.”
15
 The diplomats instead defended themselves and refused to recognize they had 
yielded to Brazil during the various negotiations held during 1999. Initial claims by Foreign 
Minister Di Tella that, “industrialists should stop crying and start becoming competitive”, 
had been replaced by the at least public recognition that there was a need for a negotiated 
solution and for willingness to “construct the political conditions for the private actors to 
reach an agreement” (La Nacion 9/23/1999) 
Even more important, because this agency’s position towards the regional project were 
strongly shaped by power considerations and its strategic beliefs and principles, its 
commitment to the strategy of regional integration had not been weakened by the 
economic/financial impact of the devaluation like the ME’s had. Despite the economic 
imbalances brought about by the Brazilian devaluation, it was believed MERCOSUR still 
constituted a “fundamental” element in Argentina’s foreign policy and that it was important 
not to bring the basic “strategic idea” into question (Campbell 1999a). The MRECIC 
opposed the measures and the unilateral approach pursued by the ME and instead insisted 
that Argentina should find a negotiated solution that could be seen as satisfactory for 
domestic producers.
16
 In addition, the diplomats were skeptical regarding the validity of the 
attempt to introduce the LAIA safeguards system: “those measures did not only appear to be 
of doubtful effectiveness in attacking the existing problems, but on the other hand, they also 
seriously risked the progress achieved in different terrain during the last few ears… 
(Campbell 1999b: 649). 
The Argentine Foreign Ministry played a central role in the first stages of political 
rapprochement and economic co-operation between Argentina and Brazil in the mid-1980s. 
The first democratic government of Raul Alfonsín had conceived of economic integration as 
a way to secure and institutionalize an end to the distrust and rivalry that had historically 
characterized bilateral relations. The stabilization of regional relations was in turn seen as 
essential for the achievement of a number of political and strategic goals. First, the regional 
co-operation was expected to contribute to the consolidation and strengthening of the newly-
restored democratic regimes.
17
 Second, defensive considerations, which as seen above were 
crucial for the Brazilian government, were also important for Argentina. Regional integration 
                                                          
15 Carlos Litzman, Manager of CIC, Interview, Buenos Aires (October 6, 2002). In response, Campbell 
stated that, “Although the reaction of industrialists is understandable, our role is to achieve a balance 
between the defence of the interests of the local industry, and MERCOSUR’s stability.” La Nación 
(31 July 1999). 
16 Peña, Interview. According to the former official, “… the Foreign Ministry was horrified at what we 
had done.” 
17 In his attempt to re-build Argentina’s international credibility and re-define its model of insertion 
into the world, Alfonsín made the consolidation of democracy the first priority of his foreign policy. 
See, for example, Costa Vaz (2002); Kaltenthaler and Mora (2002); etc. 
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was aimed at improving Argentina’s bargaining power in international negotiations over debt, 
investment and trade issues.  
In the late 1990s, and despite the ambivalence of a group within the foreign policy elite, 
the Argentine Foreign Ministry continued to see a political and strategic rationale for the 
project.
18
 In fact, the MRECIC’s commitment to MERCOSUR in 1999 was even stronger 
than it had been in the early 1990s. There were two elements underlying this strengthened 
support for the alliance with Brazil. First of all, it was a consequence of a significant degree 
of rational strategic adaptation to shifting internal and external incentives. This adaptation 
was catalyzed by the perceived limited success of the strategy of bandwagoning with the US 
followed by the Menem government since 1989,
19
 as well as the deepening political and 
economic crisis and its consequent impact on the country’s regional and global self ― 
perception. The reinvigoration of hemispheric negotiations after 1997 did not have the same 
impact that it had had three years earlier, when Argentina still thought a preferential bilateral 
agreement with the US was feasible. The generalized reassessment or downward revision of 
Argentina’s power potential had led to realization within the Foreign Ministry about the risks 
involved in the FTAA for a country like Argentina, with a small market and “little to offer” 
in term of tactical concessions.
20
 But there was also increased awareness about the fact that 
outside of Mexico, given its size and its phased opening, Brazil was the economy which 
generated greater attention from the US. In spite of Argentina’s own efforts, it had been this 
country which had become the focal point in the region (Rapoport 1998). It was thus not only 
more convenient for Argentina to negotiate jointly with its stronger neighbor, but also, it was 
in its interest to avoid risks of being excluded from a potential bilateral agreement among its 
two strategic partners. At the end of the Menem administration, thus, as Peña would put it: 
“the original idea of MERCOSUR (…) is not matched by rational alternatives for any of the 
partners. No one seems to put in question the need of facing together the challenges and 
opportunities of a globalized world” (Peña 2001: 13).
 
 
Secondly, apart from these defensive incentives to avoid a breakage of co-operation, as in 
1995, Argentine negotiators’ awareness of their power weakness relative to Brazil also 
motivated their interest in adopting a conciliatory stance. In particular, the Argentine 
diplomats sought to avoid Brazil’s retaliation, which would not only have serious 
commercial consequences, but would also severely harm diplomatic relations in the longer-
term (Avogadro 2002).  
To be fair, although the position adopted by the Argentine government in the end ― 
pressing the private sector to find an “unofficial” solution, which they did not commit to 
enforce ― did show a prioritization of the strategic relationship with Brazil, it also attempted 
to strike a balance which at least partly satisfied the private sector. The negotiation of a VER 
between the two footwear sectors was a compromise attempting to satisfy almost all parts: it 
                                                          
18 For a more detailed account of divergences within the Argentine government regarding MERCOSUR, 
see Gomez Mera (2005).  
19 See, for example, Escude (1997). 
20 See for example, Carrera, Lacunza and Redrado (2002: 25). These authors stress that the superiority 
of a bilateral agreement with the US could not be sustained on pure economic grounds. Only 
“speculation that we might obtain special benefits, […] a very unlikely option given the current 
political map in Washington, would justify taking steps in that direction.”  Thus, policy-makers are 
urged not to “overestimate Argentina’s strategic importance”, nor to “underestimate sectorial 
adjustment costs” of the process of hemispheric integration. (p. 43). 




would provide some relief to the private sector, downplaying perceptions of the costs of the 
current macroeconomic strategy, but within the framework of co-operative relations with 
Brazil, which was not only strategically important for Argentina, but also politically 
profitable for its government. Table 1 summarizes the intra-bureaucratic divergences 
underlying Argentina’s position in the crisis, examined in this section. 
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This article has tried to account for two different and seemingly inconsistent policy 
choices by the Argentine government in 1999: (1) the establishment of a number of 
protectionist measures directly benefiting the national footwear industry and triggering a 
commercial and diplomatic crisis within MERCOSUR; (2) the subsequent decision to push 
for the negotiation of a VER at the private sector level, followed by the reversal of the 
unilateral measures. The two policy moves can be explained through different theoretical 
lenses.  
First, the decision to defect from regional commitments comes into sharper focus when 
combining insights from both neoclassical and statist explanations of foreign economic 
policy-making. The analysis in this article, however, stresses the importance of state actors’ 
macroeconomic (and independent) preferences, suggesting the state remained largely in 
control of the decision-making process. This explanation challenges prevailing 
interpretations, which tend to overemphasize the role of business interests and to neglect he 
macroeconomic interest of the ME in defecting. For the Argentine ME, the measures would 
not only contribute to contain Argentina’s growing trade deficit, but would indirectly 
compensate those sectors which were increasingly discontent with the overvaluation of the 
currency. At the same time, from the ME perspective, the move was intended to put pressure 
on Brazil for negotiating a mechanism to contain the financial volatility effects of the 
devaluation on the Argentine currency. In this sense, Argentina’s unilateral measures in 1999 
should be seen as at least partly a consequence of the subordination of regional trade 
commitments to the broader concerns of macroeconomic and exchange rate stabilisation.  
The second outcome this article sought to explain, the decision by the Argentine 
government to step back from negotiations with Brazil to promote an agreement on 
quantities among the two countries’ footwear sector associations, is instead best explained by 
incorporating insights from the bureaucratic politics model. This is because, as a result of the 
greater role of the MRECIC in international negotiations and regional integration issues, 
there was a much balanced distribution of decision-making power between this agency and 
the ME. The decision to push for the negotiation of a VER at the private sector level, 
therefore, reflected a compromise between the “hawkish” position of the ME and the more 
conciliatory stance of the MRE. This reflected the deepening commitment of Argentine 
foreign policy elites to the process of regional integration. The latter was viewed as a central 
element of Argentina’s foreign policy strategy, especially given the perceived challenges 
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